"Gespenster" (2005) forms, together with "Yella" (2007), and "Jerichow" (2008), the Gespenster-trilogy of director Christian Petzold, doubtless one of the creme-De-la-creme German movie directors of our time.
Roughly, "Gespenster" tells the story of a French woman whose daughter had been kidnapped as a 3 years old child while the mother turned around her head for 1 minute in Berlin - and has never been seen ever. Since then, the mother keeps traveling to Berlin whenever there is a possibility and searches, by aid of time-dilated photography, for girls of the age of approximately the present age of her age. As we hear later in the movie, the mother was already a lot of times convinced that she had found her daughter Marie. However, this time, when she meets Nina, everything comes quite different.
The movie does not bring solutions, not even part-solutions, and insofar, it is rather disappointing. We are not getting equipped either in order to decide if the mother is really insane or not, if her actual daughter is still alive or not. Most disappointing is the end. After what we have witnessed in the movie, it is an imposition for the watcher that he is let alone as the auteur leaves Nina alone. The simple walking away symbolizing that nothing has changed, can be a strong effect of dramaturgy (f.ex. in "Umberto D."), but in "Gespenster", it is displaced.
Since critics have been suggesting Freudian motives in this movie, let me give my own attempt: Why is it that similar persons do not know one another, especially not the persons that another similar person knows? This is quite an insane question, agreed, from the standpoint of Aristotelian logic, according to which the notion of the individual holds. The individual is such a person that does not share any of its defining characteristics with anyone else. So, the Aristotelian answer to my question is: They do not know one another because their similarity is by pure change. Everybody who is not insane, believes that. However, what about the case if these similar persons share other similarities which can hardly be by change, e.g. scarfs on their left under ankle or a heart-shaped birthmark under their right shoulder-blade? This is the metaphysical context out of which this movie is made, although I am not sure whether even the director has realized that. Despite our modern, Aristotelian world, the superstition, conserved in the mythologies of people around the globe that similar people also share parts of their individuality, and that individuality, therefore, is not something erratic, but rather diffusional, so that the borders between persons are open, such and similar believes build a strong backbone of irrational-ism despite our otherwise strongly rational thinking - a source of Gespenster of the most interesting kind.
Roughly, "Gespenster" tells the story of a French woman whose daughter had been kidnapped as a 3 years old child while the mother turned around her head for 1 minute in Berlin - and has never been seen ever. Since then, the mother keeps traveling to Berlin whenever there is a possibility and searches, by aid of time-dilated photography, for girls of the age of approximately the present age of her age. As we hear later in the movie, the mother was already a lot of times convinced that she had found her daughter Marie. However, this time, when she meets Nina, everything comes quite different.
The movie does not bring solutions, not even part-solutions, and insofar, it is rather disappointing. We are not getting equipped either in order to decide if the mother is really insane or not, if her actual daughter is still alive or not. Most disappointing is the end. After what we have witnessed in the movie, it is an imposition for the watcher that he is let alone as the auteur leaves Nina alone. The simple walking away symbolizing that nothing has changed, can be a strong effect of dramaturgy (f.ex. in "Umberto D."), but in "Gespenster", it is displaced.
Since critics have been suggesting Freudian motives in this movie, let me give my own attempt: Why is it that similar persons do not know one another, especially not the persons that another similar person knows? This is quite an insane question, agreed, from the standpoint of Aristotelian logic, according to which the notion of the individual holds. The individual is such a person that does not share any of its defining characteristics with anyone else. So, the Aristotelian answer to my question is: They do not know one another because their similarity is by pure change. Everybody who is not insane, believes that. However, what about the case if these similar persons share other similarities which can hardly be by change, e.g. scarfs on their left under ankle or a heart-shaped birthmark under their right shoulder-blade? This is the metaphysical context out of which this movie is made, although I am not sure whether even the director has realized that. Despite our modern, Aristotelian world, the superstition, conserved in the mythologies of people around the globe that similar people also share parts of their individuality, and that individuality, therefore, is not something erratic, but rather diffusional, so that the borders between persons are open, such and similar believes build a strong backbone of irrational-ism despite our otherwise strongly rational thinking - a source of Gespenster of the most interesting kind.